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Utilising the Quantity Theory of Credit to Understand the Causes of 
the 2007 Financial Crisis.  
Introduction 
This paper applies insights from Richard Werner’s publications to consider the causes of the financial 
crisis, and The Bank of England’s policy responses. It will begin by explaining some of the important 
elements associated with financial deregulation, and how these changes unleashed banks power to 
create new credit money. I will then use the Quantity Theory of Credit to explain the causes of the 
2007 financial crisis. This will be followed by a consideration of the policies adopted by The Bank of 
England following the 2007 financial crisis, together with Richard Werner’s criticisms of those 
policies.  
This paper will argue that the primary constraint on United Kingdom economic development is an 
imbalance between the funds allocated by financial markets for investments in activities that 
generate output of additional new goods and services in the economy that increase GDP, and 
allocation of capital for speculation in property and financial assets. Since the 1980s bank credit 
creation has expanded at a considerably faster rate than growth in GDP (please see Figure 1), which 
indicates an increasing amount of bank credit money creation being channelled towards the 
purchase of existing financial and property assets that are not included within GDP, with the 
resulting misallocation of capital sowing the seeds of a future financial crisis. These imbalances 
cannot be rectified by continuing to allocate large quantities of new credit money to purchase 
existing assets for speculation.  Instead, there needs to be a reallocation of new credit money to 
facilitate productive investment in businesses. 
1. Financial Deregulation 
Growth of Sterling M4 became increasingly disconnected from the gross domestic product (GDP) of 
the United Kingdom economy following banking deregulation introduced by Margaret Thatcher’s 
government, following the 1979 general election (please see Figure 1).  Bank deregulation was 
predicated on the belief that banks were mere financial intermediaries, and failed to recognise that 
banks are an important source of new money creation. Financial deregulation created a context that 
promoted a rising level of indebtedness that led to rising debt servicing costs, which placed 
increasing economic stress on the real economy’s ability to finance the resulting debt servicing costs.   
Figure 1: Broad Money (M4) relative to GDP at market prices (1980 to 2018)
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Banks’ primary lending comprised of non-mortgage lending to companies, until financial 
deregulation occurred in the 1980s.  Until the 1980s domestic mortgage financing in the United 
Kingdom was largely restricted to building societies, which were separately regulated.  A Joint 
Advisory Committee placed quantitative restrictions on building societies mortgage lending, defining 
the total value of mortgage lending that should be completed each year (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd, & 
Macfarlane, 2017, p. 130).   
Prior to the Competition and Credit Control (CCC) reforms being introduced in 1971, The Bank of 
England rationed bank credit through quantitative ceilings on bank advances, and provided 
qualitative guidance that influenced the type of lending conducted by banks. In 1971, the 
Competition and Credit Control reforms were introduced that enabled clearing banks to directly 
engage in wholesale money markets, whereas previously banks had only been able to trade in 
wholesale money markets via their finance house subsidiaries, or via discount houses. This 
regulatory change enabled banks to acquire money directly from the money markets, rather than 
being dependent on the central bank providing central bank reserves and cash.  The competition and 
credit control reforms also replaced the eight per cent cash reserve ratio and 28% liquidity reserve 
ratio with a single 12 ½ per cent liquidity reserve ratio. The 1971 reforms changed The Bank of 
England’s role to managing interest rates, moving the central bank’s focus towards use of the price 
mechanism (rate of interest)2.  
Margaret Thatcher’s government removed foreign exchange controls in 1979 (Ryan-Collins, 
Greenham, Werner, & Jackson, 2011, p. 50), which opened the banking sector to increased foreign 
competition, and would later enable deregulated building societies to access overseas funding from 
international wholesale financial markets. Removal of exchange controls enabled organisations that 
were not authorised UK Banks to conduct foreign exchange transactions, leading to an explosion in 
international capital flows that caused the United Kingdom to become an important international 
centre for foreign exchange (including Eurodollar) transactions. 
Further financial deregulation in 1980 led to the removal of the Bank of England ‘corset’ 
(supplementary special deposits scheme) that previously restricted banks’ ability to conduct 
domestic mortgage lending, and enabled banks to effectively compete with building societies 
mortgage provision for the first time (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd, & Macfarlane, 2017, p. 132; Bank of 
England, 1991).  Abolition of the corset was a consequence of the removal of foreign exchange 
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controls in 1979, which enabled banks to acquire funds offshore, and made the corset ineffective. 
The liquidity reserve ratio that banks were required to hold was gradually reduced from 12 ½ per 
cent in 1971, until eventually becoming effectively voluntary (Ryan-Collins, Greenham, Werner, & 
Jackson, 2011, p. 51). Quantitative restrictions on building society lending were also removed, as a 
consequence of the 1986 Building Societies Act that allowed building societies to borrow a 
proportion of their funds from wholesale money markets, and also enabled building societies to 
demutualise and convert to a bank (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd, & Macfarlane, 2017, p. 133). The reforms 
caused the breakdown of the building society interest rate cartel. The resulting increase in 
competitive intensity within the financial sector led to falling interest rates, and a declining interest 
rate spread (spread refers to the difference between the percentage cost of bank deposits and 
percentage return from loaned funds). 
The Stock Exchange was deregulated on 27th October 1986, which is often referred to as the ‘Big 
Bang’. It enabled outside, and often foreign, ownership of firms that were members of the Stock 
Exchange. Deregulation enabled international banks to acquire stockbroking and jobbing firms in the 
City of London, and removed the requirements for stockbrokers and stockjobbers (stockjobbers 
create markets in shares) to be separated. It also removed the separation between investment 
banking and deposit-taking institutions that was still enforced in America through the Glass-Steagall 
Act, which caused American banks to increase their presence in the United Kingdom. Removing the 
separation between investment banking and deposit-taking institutions potentially enables 
investment banks to acquire new credit money from another part of the banking group that 
conducts deposit-taking activities, in order to fund trading positions in derivatives, commodities, 
property and financial assets. 
The introduction of buy-to-let mortgages in 1996 enabled investors to purchase houses for rent, and 
caused private landlords to increase their share of the housing stock from 9.4% in 2000 to 19 per 
cent of the United Kingdom housing stock in 2014 (Council of Mortgage Lenders, 2016). Landlords 
generally receive a yield of between 3% and 5% per annum (Council of Mortgage Lenders, 2016).  
Internationalisation of bank lending led to the development of an international regulatory 
framework.  The Basle Committee on Bank Supervision was created in 1974 to harmonise 
international banking regulations, which led to the 1988 Basle Accord introducing minimum capital 
requirements, and risk weighting of assets. The risk weighting of loans to non-financial firms is 
double the risk weighting of secured mortgages on residential property, and a consequence of the 
Basle risk weightings is that banks can earn fees and net interest margins on double the amount of 
lending to real estate relative to lending to non-financial firms, with the same capital base. The first 
Basle accord produced significant global growth in both mortgage lending on residential property 
and bank leverage in the 1990s (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd, & Macfarlane, 2017, p. 135).   
2. Credit money creation by banks and building societies 
My previous paper (Starkey, 2018) explained how banks create credit money, and that the majority 
of money in the economy (sterling M4 liabilities to the private sector) comprises bank deposits 
(please see Figure 2). The credit creation theory of banking proposes that individual banks can create 
money, and banks do not solely lend out deposits that have been provided to the bank. Instead, the 
bank creates bank deposits as a consequence of bank lending (McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014 ; 
Werner R. A., 2013; Ryan-Collins, Greenham, Werner, & Jackson, 2011). Consequently, the amount 
of money that a bank can create is not constrained by their deposit taking activities. The repayment 
of existing debt destroys money, by reducing bank loans (asset side of balance sheet) and customer 
deposits (liability side of the bank balance sheet).  
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Figure 2: Bank deposits in relation to cash in circulation. The Composition of Sterling M4 Liabilities to the private sector, 
excluding intermediate other financial companies (OFCs)
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There was a significant increase in bank lending between 2000 and 2007, when the annual 
percentage increase in total lending by United Kingdom financial institutions exceeded 10% per 
annum (please see Figure 3). Increased lending caused bank deposits to increase, creating new credit 
money that produced an annual increase in money supply of between 6% and 10% per annum 
between 2000 and 2007 (please see Figure 4). Commercial banks introduction of new credit money 
into the economy is creating new purchasing power within the economy that did not previously 
exist, which significantly increases demand in sectors of the economy to which credit money is 
allocated.  
Figure 3: Annual percentage change in total lending by United Kingdom financial institutions (1999 to 2017)
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Figure 4: Growth in bank deposits during the year as a percentage of money supply at the beginning of the year (1998 to 
2017)
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3. The Quantity Theory of Credit 
When increases in money supply as a consequence of new credit money creation by banks exceeds 
the growth of GDP (growth in gross domestic product) transactions in the economy, there are likely 
to be inflationary consequences. However, the consequences of credit money creation depend on 
the sector to which credit money is allocated. 
The Quantity Theory of Credit presented by Richard Werner (Werner R. A., 1997; Werner R. A., 
2013; Ryan-Collins, Greenham, Werner, & Jackson, 2011, pp. 109 - 110; Werner R. A., 2005, p. 226) 
proposes that the impact of bank lending for GDP transactions will depend on the purpose of 
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lending. If lending is directed towards consumer credit that increases consumption, there is likely to 
be an increase in consumer price inflation as a consequence of increasing aggregate demand 
relative to the aggregate supply of products. Whilst bank lending for business investment to private 
non-financial corporations and unincorporated businesses encourages growth in economic 
activity. Investment that increases output of goods and services included in GDP transactions 
suppresses inflationary pressures in the economy, as a consequence of increased production of 
goods and services, and also raises the incomes of factors of production. However, only 15.5% of 
lending by financial institutions is being directed towards investment by non-financial firms and 
unincorporated businesses (please see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Allocation of lending by financial institutions to sectors of the economy in June 2018
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Despite an increase in overall lending by financial institutions following the 2007 financial crisis, it is 
apparent that there was a substantial reduction in financial institutions lending to the sectors of the 
economy that increase value added from production of new goods and services, which increases 
gross domestic product and real incomes within the economy.  Lending to both non-financial 
corporations and unincorporated business has fallen significantly following the 2007 financial crisis. 
Financial institutions lending to non-financial corporations has fallen 21% since 2008 (from £515 
billion to £405 billion), whilst lending to unincorporated businesses has fallen by 41% since 2008 
(from £48 billion to £28 billion) (please see Figure 6). This could be an important contributory factor 
to weak labour productivity growth following the 2007 / 2008 financial crisis, because investment in 
physical capital stock per worker is an important factor in determining the growth of labour 
productivity (Barnett, Batten, Chu, Franklin, & Sebastiá-Barriel, 2014, p. 122).  
Figure 6: Financial institutions lending to private non-financial corporations and unincorporated businesses following the 
2007 - 2008 financial crisis
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There have also been criticisms of some banks management of loans to small and medium sized 
enterprises. Nicky Morgan who chairs the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee recently 
stated in response to Promontory Financial Group’s report (Promontory Financial Group, 2018) on 
the management of small and medium sized business customers by Royal Bank of Scotland’s, Global 
Restructuring Group division: 
“The findings in the report are disgraceful. The overarching priority at all levels of GRG was not the 
health and strength of customers, but the generation of income for RBS, through made-up fees, high 
interest rates, and the acquisition of equity and property”. 
The Quantity Theory of Credit proposes that increasing the allocation of credit money for non-GDP 
transactions (transactions that do not increase GDP (gross domestic product)) will have no impact 
on economic growth, and will instead promote asset price inflation (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 95; 
Werner R. A., 2005). Credit growth for non-GDP transactions must be increasing, if total credit 
growth exceeds GDP growth (Werner R. A., 2013, p. 366). When lending for non-GDP transactions 
grows faster than the growth in GDP transactions it can produce asset price bubbles that create the 
potential for a future financial crisis. Non-GDP transactions are associated with the purchase of 
existing financial (for example, bonds, shares, and derivatives) and property assets that are sold in 
secondary markets. Secondary markets transact products previously sold within markets, such as 
previously issued financial assets (for example, company shares, bonds, and derivatives), and the 
transfer of ownership of property that has previously been purchased. Whilst primary markets trade 
newly created financial assets (for example, initial placing of shares by companies, rights issues of 
shares, and newly issued bonds) and the sale of new properties. The majority of financial and 
property assets are being resold, and so are traded within secondary markets.  
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Lending in the United Kingdom is primarily directed towards the purchase of existing property and 
financial assets (please see Figure 7), which encouraged rapid growth in property and share prices, 
because increased purchasing power was directed towards the purchase of already existing assets 
that are relatively fixed in supply. During the period 1999 to 2007 the average United Kingdom 
house price increased by 140% from £93,000 in 1999 to £223,000 in 2007 (please see Figure 9).  
Figure 10 indicates that the growth in lending by financial institutions for purchasing property is an 
important determinant of house price growth, with a Pearson correlation coefficient between these 
two variables being 0.758. Gross domestic product only includes transactions in newly created 
assets, and so an increase in money supply directed towards purchasing assets within secondary 
markets will cause a reduction in the money supply’s velocity of circulation (Werner R. , 2012; 
Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 95).   
Figure 7: Net lending by all financial institutions by lending category, and relative to GDP (£billion)
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Figure 8: Percentage change in house prices in relation to percentage change in lending to purchase dwellings. 
 
 
Figure 9: Average United Kingdom house price 1970 to 2017
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Figure 10: Impact of change in lending to purchase dwellings by financial institutions on house price inflation 
 
Increased borrowing by speculators to purchase property and financial assets is encouraged by 
increased collateral arising from the initial speculative gains resulting from rising asset prices. A 
further factor increasing demand for assets whose value is rising, is speculators expectations that 
there will be future speculative gains arising from further increases in asset prices. Richard Werner 
(2005, p. 228; 2013, p. 362) refers to this as Say’s Law of Credit, because an increased supply of 
credit creates greater demand for credit to purchase property and financial assets, as a consequence 
of increased lending causing speculators to believe that there will be future increases in property 
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Banking crises tend to follow a period of rapid increases in asset prices (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). A 
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transfer of funds to this sector leads to asset price increases that induce yet more credit demand 
and more credit supply, which is at the core of financial instability in modern economies”. 
The 2007 financial crisis was a consequence of commercial banks’ lending excessively for non-GDP 
transactions that encouraged speculators to purchase existing properties and financial assets with 
the intention of profiting from increasing asset values. Flows of new bank credit money promoted an 
increase in the prices of financial assets and property relative to the prices of goods and services in 
the real economy. Misalignment of prices in the financialised and real economies produced 
increasing debt servicing costs within the real economy, which placed increasing burdens on the real 
economy to service loans acquired to conduct non-GDP transactions. In the immediate aftermath of 
the 2007 financial crisis there was a need to resolve structural imbalances within the economy, 
which arose from rapidly increasing debt servicing costs that were a consequence of prices within 
the non-GDP sector of the economy rising much faster than the real-economic output of the 
economy could sustain. 
Richard Werner suggests The Bank of England should have introduced regulations that would cause 
commercial banks to slowly reduce their lending and credit money creation to facilitate non-GDP 
transactions relating to property and financial asset purchases, in order to facilitate the rebalancing 
of financial flows between sectors of the economy.  Richard Werner suggests that The Bank of 
England should introduce regulations in the form of credit guidance (also referred to as window 
guidance11 (Werner R. A., 2005, pp. 268 - 270; Werner R. A., 2013, p. 368; Ryan-Collins, Greenham, 
Werner, & Jackson, 2011, p. 111)), in order to define the proportion of lending that should be 
allocated by commercial banks to various sectors of the economy. The current aim of credit 
guidance should be to promote increased lending to the real economy to promote an increase in 
GDP transactions, whilst reducing lending to speculative sectors of the economy. Commercial banks 
would incur financial penalties, if they did not adhere to changing the direction of lending to 
improve macroeconomic stability. The Bank of England has not introduced credit guidance for 
commercial banks, and imbalances within the economy have consequently increased. Lending for 
the purchase of property continued to increase relative to lending to private non-financial 
companies for investment that would increase GDP, post 2007 (please see Figure 11). Secondly, 
lending by financial institutions to other financial institutions continued to rise relative to loans to 
private non-financial companies following the 2007 financial crisis (please see Figure 11).  
Figure 11: Lending to individuals and financial corporations relative to non-financial corporations
12
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Increased lending for property purchase caused a reduction in the affordability of property in 
England, which is reflected by the median English house price increasing from 3.5 times median 
annual earnings in 1997 to 7.7 times median annual earnings in 2016 (please see Figure 12). The 
Bank of England could introduce a regulation that reintroduced the custom and practice pursued by 
financial institutions during the 1960’s and 1970’s that limited the amount that could be borrowed 
for property purchase to a maximum of three times the borrower’s annual income13. However, a 
decision to re-establish the three times earnings limit on borrowing for property purchase could 
cause a very substantial reduction in the average English house price, with any reduction in lending 
for property purchase likely to have a significant negative impact on the wealth of households that 
are significantly exposed to house price fluctuations. There is the prospect of a Minsky Moment 
(Minsky, 1992) occurring within the housing market that could severely constrain consumer 
expenditure, as a consequence of the wealth effect adversely impacting home owning consumers. 
Figure 12: Ratio of median English house price to median annual earnings in England
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Richard Werner suggests that there is a structural aspect to the United Kingdom banking system’s 
focus on lending for speculative investment. Therefore, an important factor in preventing a future 
financial crisis would be to change the structure of the United Kingdom banking sector. Richard 
Werner suggests that the United Kingdom banking system is oligopolistic in nature (a few banks 
dominate the market), and operate at a national level. Senior management in United Kingdom banks 
are focussed on pursuing large investment projects, and there is a reduced emphasis on meeting the 
requirements of small to medium sized enterprises.  Whereas, Richard Werner suggests Germany’s 
more regionally situated banking system facilitates greater familiarity of a bank’s management with 
the distinctive requirements of small and medium sized enterprises operating within their region, 
which is particularly important because small and medium sized enterprises generate the majority of 
jobs within an economy (Werner R. A., 2013, p. 382), and Mittelstand15 are an important factor in 
post-war German economic development. Local and regional banks can reduce their exposure to 
credit default risk on business loans, due to their closer relationships with the business people 
borrowing money. This proposition aligns with Michael Porter’s theory relating to clusters that 
suggests service businesses, which includes banks, are important in giving a particular geographic 
area a competitive advantage in a particular industry, because the service sector in that area 
becomes focussed on meeting the unique requirements of important business sectors in the bank’s 
locality (Porter, 2000)16.  
The United Kingdom’s development of a large oligopolistic national banking structure may have 
contributed to the development of London as an important international banking centre. This would 
suggest the importance of developing requisite variety within the United Kingdom banking sector. 
However, requisite variety (Ashby, 1969) is undermined by institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) that cause banks that do not have the same approach to the dominant banks within 
their national market, to pursue strategies with the intention of becoming increasingly aligned with 
the dominant banking model adopted by the leading banking groups within the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, the Clydesdale Yorkshire Banking Group that has a regional focus and diversified lending 
portfolio (which included significant business banking activity), chose to merge with Virgin Money 
that is more heavily oriented towards consumer finance and property lending, to develop a greater 
national presence, and become a challenger bank to the leading United Kingdom banking groups. 
The failure of the government and central bank to resolve the significant imbalances in commercial 
bank lending between GDP transactions and non-GDP transactions will provide the basis for the next 
financial crisis. Lending for investment that increases GDP transactions is economically sustainable, 
because the value-added generated from producing new goods and services that increase GDP is 
used to finance repayment of interest and capital on borrowings, with the remainder of retained 
earnings being distributed between stakeholders to increase factor incomes within the economy. 
Whereas allocation of lending for non-GDP transactions creates asset bubbles. The next financial 
crisis is likely to be deeper than the 2007 financial crisis due to increased levels of debt, and 
increased imbalance in commercial banks’ lending between GDP and non-GDP sectors of the 
economy.  
 
4. Central Bank Policies to Manage the 2007 Financial Crisis 
4.1 Should The Bank of England reduce interest rates in response to this type of financial 
crisis? 
The first policy decision by The Bank of England was to reduce interest rates, to reduce debt 
servicing costs and promote increased economic activity. The Monetary Policy Committee of The 
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Bank of England reduced interest rates in steps from 5.5% in December 2007 to 0.5% in March 2009 
(Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 97). The Bank of England influences market interest rate by lending and 
borrowing central bank reserves.  The primary objective of The Bank of England’s open market 
operations (OMO) is to supply a sufficient quantity of central bank reserves to financial markets, in 
order to ensure that the market rate of interest remains close to the central bank policy rate (Bank 
of England base rate) (Ryan-Collins, Greenham, Werner, & Jackson, 2011, pp. 48 - 50). 
The transmission mechanisms of monetary policy identify the various channels by which interest 
rate changes influence economic activity (please see Figure 13), and are discussed in a paper 
produced by the Bank of England (1999). A change in the official Bank of England interest rate 
influences market interest rates charged by other financial institutions, by altering the rate of 
interest that banks receive on the balances they hold at the Bank of England. A change in the official 
market interest rate causes savings rates to change, together with interest rates on various types of 
borrowing. The impact of changing interest rates impacts real economic activity through various 
channels. Lower market interest rates provide an economic incentive to reduce saving, which 
promotes increased consumer expenditure. Lower market interest rates reduce existing debt 
servicing costs, which increases personal disposable incomes and encourages greater consumption. 
Lower interest rates also encourage increased borrowing by both firms and households, because the 
future cost of repaying debt is reduced. New investment is promoted as lower interest rates enable 
firms to invest in projects that generate a lower return on investment than previously, but still 
achieve a percentage rate of return that exceeds their cost of capital. Rising demand within the 
economy causes businesses to operate at higher levels of capacity utilisation, and rising capacity 
utilisation within firms combined with lower interest rates encourage firms to increase investment. 
Lower interest rates promote increased asset prices, because reduced market interest rates 
encourage investors to transfer their money to other asset classes that generate higher rates of 
return. If market interest rates are reduced from 5% to 1%, then property investors are likely to be 
willing to purchase properties that produce a net return on investment in excess of the 1% money 
market interest rate. A reduction in the market interest rate encourages investors to bid up the price 
of assets, until the rate of return earned on an asset is slightly above the money market (risk free) 
interest rate. Although, the volatility of returns associated with a particular asset class, and risk to 
capital, will be further factors influencing the premium that investors seek relative to the risk-free 
rate of return earned on money. Higher asset prices produce a wealth effect, because owners of 
assets perceive themselves to be wealthier as a consequence of rising asset prices. Greater 
perceived wealth is likely to encourage greater consumption by asset rich consumers.  
Lower interest rates also influence expectations of households and firms about the future state of 
the economy, which will influence both consumption and investment behaviour within the 
economy. However, there is some uncertainty regarding how consumers and producers perceive the 
impact of interest rate changes on the economy. Lower interest rates may cause economic agents to 
perceive that economic activity will increase for the reasons discussed above, which will encourage 
increased consumption, production, and investment. However, economic agents may perceive that a 
reduction in interest rates is being introduced because the monetary authorities are concerned 
about the declining prospects of the economy, and the resulting pessimism could cause a reduction 
in consumption, production, and investment. 
Figure 13: Transmission Mechanisms of Monetary Policy 
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Lower domestic interest rates reduce the rate of return earned on United Kingdom investments 
relative to rates of return earned in other currency areas, which encourages investors to move their 
capital to currency areas offering a better rate of return on capital. Expectations of currency 
depreciation will also encourage investors to move their money out of the currency, in the 
expectation that they can increase their capital by moving their money back into the currency 
following depreciation.  Investors capital transfers to other currency areas are expected to cause a 
depreciation in the value of a currency relative to other currencies. Currency depreciation will 
benefit exporters whose product price can be reduced in export markets, increasing sales volume as 
a consequence of making their product proposition more price competitive within industries where 
price competitiveness is an important basis for international competitiveness. Alternatively, 
exporters can maintain their prices in export markets to increase profit margins. Imported products 
become more expensive when a currency depreciates, which encourages consumers to substitute 
domestically produced products that are more price competitive following currency depreciation for 
imports. Therefore, currency depreciation promotes increased demand for products produced 
within the currency area whose interest rates have fallen relatively faster than other currency areas. 
An expansionary monetary policy promotes increased economic activity in the short-term. However, 
debt brings forward future consumption into the current period, which acts to constrain the growth 
of consumer expenditure in future years. This is a consequence of an expansionary monetary policy 
making the acquisition of loans more attractive, by reducing the future purchasing power that must 
be foregone as a consequence of acquiring a particular loan amount. However, in the medium to 
long-term the increased indebtedness resulting from an expansionary monetary policy will constrain 
future economic activity. Poorer households have the highest level of borrowing, and the largest 
marginal propensity to consume. Therefore, there will be a significant constraint on the growth of 
future consumer expenditure and economic activity as a consequence of high debt levels 
constraining future consumption by groups with the highest marginal propensity to consume (Mian 
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& Sufi, 2011). Steve Keen stated that the only way for economies “to avoid a substantial decline in 
aggregate demand (and therefore a recession) from private sector behaviour alone is for private 
debt to continue rising faster than gross domestic product. But in a world in which debt necessitates 
interest payments, at some point aggregate debt servicing costs will exceed the income available to 
meet them” (Keen, 2017, p. 102). 
Lee and Werner (2018; Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 94) suggest that lower interest rates are not a 
lead indicator of increased future economic activity, due to the operation of the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanisms discussed in the Bank of England (1999) paper. Instead, Lee and Werner 
(2018; Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 94) suggest interest rate changes follow changes in the economic 
growth rate, and interest rates do not promote changes in the economic growth rate. Consequently, 
an improvement in the economic growth rate causes interest rates to rise, whereas a contraction in 
the economic growth rate causes interest rates to fall (Lee & Werner, 2018, p. 28; Werner R. A., 
2018; Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 94).   
Lee and Werner suggest that improving the United Kingdom’s economic growth rate requires The 
Bank of England to increase interest rates (Lee & Werner, 2018, p. 32; Werner R. A., 2018).  Lee and 
Werner’s rationale for this counter-intuitive proposition is that The Bank of England currently relies 
on using the price mechanism (interest rates) to achieve market clearing within financial markets.  
However, the price mechanism only achieves balance between the quantities demanded and 
supplied within a market when a number of stringent conditions are satisfied.  The conditions 
required for the price mechanism to efficiently clear markets include perfect and symmetrical 
information being held by both buyers and suppliers, perfect competition occurs within the market, 
there are no transaction costs, there are no time constraints, and price adjustments occur 
instantaneously within markets.  The failure of financial markets to satisfy these stringent criteria 
means that the price mechanism does not provide an efficient means for matching supply and 
demand within financial markets (Lee & Werner, 2018, p. 27).   
Lee and Werner (2018, p. 27) suggest quantities become the primary driver of resource allocation 
when the price mechanism does not provide an efficient way of allocating resources within financial 
markets, due to the failure of financial markets to achieve at least some of the above criteria.  When 
quantities become the main driver of resource allocation, market power and the ability to extract 
economic rents are available to the side of the market (buyers or suppliers) that is most limited 
(referred to as ‘the short side of the market’).  Within financial markets the primary constraint is on 
lending, with a large number of borrowers competing for a limited availability of funds.  Therefore, 
the supply of lending is the ‘short side’ within financial markets, and lenders engage in rationing the 
available funds based on their decision criteria.   
Richard Werner suggests lower interest rates cause speculative investors to crowd-out businesses 
that seek to borrow funds for investment in productive assets to increase gross domestic product. 
Higher interest rates remove speculative investors from the market, providing a greater availability 
of funds for investment in productive assets that increase gross domestic product.  Increased 
interest rates would lead to an increasing proportion of new credit money being allocated to sectors 
of the economy that use the funds to create new goods and services to increase gross domestic 
product and economic growth. Consequently, Richard Werner suggests that increasing interest rates 
will counter-intuitively produce an improved economic growth rate. Allocation of new credit money 
to productive investment creates a more sustainable financial system, because the value-added 
created by productive investment is used to repay loan capital and interest on accumulated debt, 
and generates profits to be shared between stakeholders of the value-added creating organisation. 
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4.2 What type of quantitative easing is appropriate? 
Central banks must manage two important problems that financial institutions may encounter 
during a financial crisis. Firstly, banks’ must be able to maintain liquidity, which refers to banks being 
able to generate the cash required to meet their depositors demands to withdraw money from their 
bank accounts. Maintaining liquidity can be problematic for banks during a financial crisis, because 
banks engage in maturity transformation. Maturity transformation refers to banks generally 
acquiring money from customers for a short period of time, whilst providing loans to customers for 
much longer periods (for example, a bank may provide a 25-year mortgage). The difference in 
interest rates associated with borrowing for short periods of time whilst lending for a much longer 
period provides an interest rate spread that enables banks to make a profit.  However, if a 
sufficiently large proportion of depositors seek to withdraw their money from the financial 
institution within a short period of time, the bank will have insufficient money balances and liquid 
assets to satisfy customers demands to withdraw their money17.  
Commercial banks must also remain solvent, which refers to commercial banks having sufficient 
assets to meet all their liabilities. Bank solvency is determined by whether a bank has sufficient 
capital to cover losses that reduce the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet. Banks have a relatively 
limited amount of capital relative to the credit money that they have created. When a bank’s bad 
debts exceed the bank’s 10% capital cushion it will cause a bank to become insolvent, because their 
assets are no longer sufficient to cover their liabilities (Werner R. , 2012, p. 21).    
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Figure 14: Important categories of assets and liabilities within a bank's balance sheet.  
 
To protect the solvency of commercial banks, The Bank of England conducted a programme of 
quantitative easing, which involved purchasing assets primarily from non-bank financial 
intermediaries such as pension funds and insurance companies. Quantitative easing occurs when the 
central bank creates new money electronically, by issuing central bank reserves to purchase financial 
assets such as government and corporate bonds from financial institutions. Quantitative easing 
encourages non-bank financial institutions such as pension funds and insurance companies to 
diversify out of government backed securities into other types of financial assets and property, 
which helped to sustain property and financial asset prices, at least in the short-to medium term.  
Maintaining asset prices prevented a reduction in house prices that would cause a contraction in 
consumer expenditure, as a consequence of the ‘wealth effect’. Maintaining asset prices avoids 
asset rich consumers perceiving themselves to be poorer as a consequence of falling asset prices, 
which would cause them to reduce their personal consumption. The Bank of England’s approach to 
quantitative easing avoided the significant fall in consumer expenditure that occurred in the United 
States, which is explained by Mian and Sufi’s levered - losses framework (Mian & Sufi, 2015, pp. 45-
59). 
The Bank of England’s quantitative easing programme is similar to the traditional open market 
operations policy conducted by the Bank of England to influence the flow of money and liquidity in 
the financial system. The Bank of England primarily purchased government treasury stock and some 
corporate bonds from non-bank financial intermediaries, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies, but also purchased some assets from commercial banks. The quantitative easing 
programme was largely spent purchasing government bonds (£435 billion), although a further £10 
billion was spent purchasing corporate bonds. The £445 billion of quantitative easing (please see 
Figure 16) is equivalent to approximately £6,780 per United Kingdom resident. Money supply 
increases from MS to MS2 as a consequence of quantitative easing, which reduces the interest rate 
from ir to ir2 (please see   
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Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Impact of quantitative easing on interest rates
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Figure 16: Quantitative easing in £ billions since 2009
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The quantitative easing process involves the pension fund’s bank receiving additional central bank 
reserves from the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility, which is used by the Bank of England to 
purchase gilt edged securities from financial markets. Consequently, pension funds holdings of 
treasury stock are reduced, and there is a corresponding increase in pension fund’s holdings of 
commercial bank deposits.  The T-accounts for the pension fund and commercial bank resulting from 
the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility purchasing a £100 of treasury stock are shown below: 
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Quantitative easing may have a limited impact on commercial banks liquidity, if non-bank financial 
institutions receiving the money rapidly use the money received from the sale of government 
treasury stock to acquire other types of financial assets and property. If the non-bank financial 
institutions maintain bank deposits with commercial banks the programme of quantitative easing 
will have a liquidity effect, because commercial banks’ will have significantly increased holdings of 
central bank reserves, which provides banks with the additional liquidity to increase their lending to 
the real economy and create new credit money for GDP transactions. Commercial banks high level of 
risk aversion in a recession caused by a high level of non-performing assets, means that this channel 
has been relatively weak in promoting greater economic activity. Secondly, the significant growth in 
financial asset and property prices meant new bank lending was directed towards the purchase of 
financial assets and property, because of the price momentum in these assets classes resulting from 
previous bank lending. Continued strong growth in financial and property asset prices provided 
speculators with the collateral for loans, and caused banks to perceive a low credit default risk 
associated with lending for speculative purposes.  
Quantitative easing by The Bank of England increased the price of treasury stock as a consequence 
of the increased demand for government bonds created by the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase 
Facility. There is a portfolio rebalancing effect as The Bank of England’s asset purchase programme 
increases the price of treasury stock due to the reduced availability of treasury stock, which reduces 
the financial return (yield) received by investors in treasury stock. The financial return on treasury 
stock is fixed when treasury stock is first issued, as a percentage of the £100 value of each unit of 
treasury stock until the maturity date of the treasury stock. For example, Treasury Stock 1.5% 2020 
generates a return of £1.50 per £100 unit of treasury stock between the date when the treasury 
stock is issued and the maturity date of the treasury stock. Reduced yields on treasury stock 
encourage financial institutions to acquire other types of financial asset (for example, corporate 
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bonds, equities, and derivatives) and property that generate a higher yield. Increased demand by 
non-bank financial intermediaries for property, corporate bonds and equity helps to maintain asset 
prices, which will avoid bank loans that were used to acquire these types of asset from becoming 
non-performing in the banking sector.  
The quantitative easing policy succeeded in maintaining both property and financial asset prices, and 
promoted further significant increases in asset prices after the 2007 financial crisis. £199 billion of 
quantitative easing conducted during 2009 and 2010 supported house prices, with the average 
house price increasing by 11.1% in 2010, despite there only being an increase of 0.7% in lending by 
financial institutions to individuals for property purchase. The average house price increased from 
£223,000 in 2007 to £283,000 in 2016 (please see Figure 9), an increase of 27%. Whilst the Financial 
Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index has doubled since 1st February 2009, which provides a 
measure of share price increases following the quantitative easing programme.  
The Bank of England’s policy of maintaining asset prices is intended to maintain the solvency of 
banks (bank assets are at least equal to, and ideally exceed, bank liabilities). Bank solvency enables 
the interbank market to continue to operate, because lenders within the market are no longer 
concerned about the risk of counter-party credit default, which maintains liquidity within the 
banking system. However, attempts by the monetary authorities to maintain asset prices above the 
historic mean, which aims to maintain the stability of the banking sector in the short-to-medium 
term, is likely to increase the risk of significant future asset price reductions that would sow the 
seeds of a future financial crisis that is more serious than the previous financial crisis. 
Werner and Lyonnet (2012, p. 94) suggest the Bank of England’s quantitative easing programme that 
was announced in 2009 had no apparent effect on United Kingdom economic growth. Lyonnet and 
Werner suggest that to promote economic growth, The Bank of England should have directly 
targeted the growth of bank credit for business investment that facilitates growth in GDP 
transactions (2012, p. 94). The Bank of England could have provided loan guarantees for lending to 
non-financial corporations and unincorporated businesses, to indemnify risk averse banks for 
lending to sectors of the economy that raise GDP (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 96). The approach to 
quantitative easing adopted by the Bank of England was not the form of quantitative easing 
proposed by Richard Werner, because it did not promote increased credit creation by commercial 
banks as a consequence of the central bank agreeing to purchase all commercial banks impaired and 
non-performing loans at face value (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 96)20. The Bank of England was 
unwilling to engage in cleaning commercial banks’ balance sheet of non-performing loans, because 
of the potential moral hazard this created. Moral hazard suggests that if commercial banks are 
protected from the consequences of poor lending practices there is a risk that commercial banks will 
fail to learn from previous mistakes, which will increase future systemic risk in the financial system.  
Despite £199 billion of quantitative easing conducted by the Bank of England during 2009 to 2010, 
total lending by financial institutions fell during the period 2010 to 2015 (please see Figure 3), and 
the reduction in lending to non-financial corporations and unincorporated businesses was 
particularly significant (please see Figure 6). Reduction in lending was so significant in 2011 that the 
money supply declined, due to a fall in bank deposits (please see Figure 4). Commercial banks 
continued to emphasise lending for non-GDP transactions as a consequence of continued increases 
in financial asset and property prices, which suggests that commercial banks have failed to learn the 
lessons provided by the 2007 financial crisis.  
Lyonnet and Werner (2012, p. 96) suggest the Bank of England could increase economic activity by 
lending directly to companies and the government. Lyonnet and Werner (2012, p. 96) also suggest 
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that government should no longer issue bonds to fund government deficits. Instead, government 
should borrow directly from commercial banks, or The Bank of England, through standard loan 
contracts. Borrowing from commercial banks, or the central bank, creates new money that will not 
crowd-out existing private sector lending. Whereas, issuing bonds on the Stock Exchange will 
prevent the money government borrows from being loaned to the private sector, because the bond 
market primarily comprises of non-bank financial institutions that do not have the ability to create 
new credit money. 
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1
 The chart and related data are available within the M4 worksheet, which is contained in the charts and data 
workbook. 
2
 Whilst the policy rate defines the rate at which banks and other financial institutions can access cash and 
Bank of England reserves, it does not constrain the rate at which financial institutions can lend to other 
organisations and individuals. 
3
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘money supply’ worksheet, which is contained in the 
charts and data workbook. 
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4
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘all financial institutions’ worksheet, which is contained in 
the charts and data workbook. 
 
5
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘all financial institutions’ worksheet, which is contained in 
the charts and data workbook. 
6
 The chart and related data are available within the summary worksheet, which is contained in the charts and 
data workbook. 
7
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘all financial institutions’ worksheet, which is contained in 
the charts and data workbook. 
8
 Please see cell AA51 in the house prices worksheet, which is contained in the charts and data workbook. 
9
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘all financial institutions’ worksheet, which is contained in 
the charts and data workbook. 
10
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘house prices’ worksheet, which is contained in the charts 
and data workbook. 
11
 Japanese monetary authorities operated a system of quantitative and qualitative credit controls during the 
post-war period, which Richard Werner refers to as 'window guidance' (Werner R. A., 2005, p. 269).  Effective 
control and direction of credit by the monetary authorities supported rapid Japanese economic development 
during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Credit controls should be developed with the aim of achieving specific 
economic growth targets. However, Japanese 'window guidance' from the mid-1980s allowed rapid credit 
expansion, and did not restrict lending for speculative purposes, which has since caused serious economic 
problems in Japan.  Therefore, it is not sufficient simply to have credit controls in place.  Credit controls 
implemented by the monetary authorities must aim to avoid excessive credit creation by the banking system, 
and limit the amount of credit being directed towards the purchase of speculative assets. 
12
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘all financial institutions’ worksheet, which is contained in 
the charts and data workbook. 
13
 The Bank of England have developed macroprudential policies since the 2007 financial crisis to avoid 
another financial crisis.  The Financial Policy Committee has been created, which is able to impose loan to 
value, and loan to income, ratios on mortgages issued in the United Kingdom.  In 2014, the Financial Policy 
Committee defined that no more than 15 per cent of new bank lending for residential home purchases should 
have a loan value exceeding 4.5 times the borrower’s annual income. 
14
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘house prices’ worksheet, which is contained in the charts 
and data workbook. 
15
 Mittelstand refers to a German small or medium sized enterprise that is family owned, and focusses on a 
particular niche sector of a product market.  
16
 Therefore, banks within California have developed a specialism in accepting Californian wineries fermented 
wine as collateral for business loans. 
17
 A shortage of liquidity created a problem for Northern Rock Bank, when a sufficiently large group of 
customers wanted to withdraw their money from the bank at the start of the 2007 financial crisis. 
18
 I have used the liquidity preference theory of interest rate determination, which is also referred to as 
portfolio balance theory, to show that an increase in money supply will cause a reduction in the rate of 
interest.  However, please note that a vertical money supply curve suggests that money supply is exogenously 
determined (government determines the amount of money in the economy), whereas this paper argues that 
money supply is determined by the actions of financial institutions operating within the market, which means 
that money supply is endogenously determined. 
19
 The chart and related data are available within the ‘quantitative easing’ worksheet, which is contained in the 
charts and data workbook. 
20
 The Bank of England did conduct this activity to a limited extent, through the Bank of England’s ‘Special 
Liquidity Scheme’, which was accessible to banks and building societies between April 2008 and 30
th
 January 
2009 (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012, p. 97), which allowed banks and building societies to swap some of their 
illiquid assets for liquid United Kingdom treasury bills. 
